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Abstract
There is now ample evidence that jobs and wages have been polarizing at the
extremes of the skill distribution since the early 90s. Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003)
have suggested that this might be due to technology substituting more easily for labor
in performing routine rather than non-routine tasks. Other potential explanations
include globalization. Active empirical research has now identiﬁed important stylized
facts. The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical exploration of alternative
potential causes to this labor market polarization, and to identify which, if any, are
consistent with the stylized facts.
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The most widely accepted explanation for the spectacular rise of wage inequalities since
the late 70s builds on the role of technology transformation that would be biased in favor
of skilled workers and against unskilled workers. See Katz and Autor (1999) for a survey
of this literature. Evidence of a slowing of overall wage inequality growth over the last
15 years, however, has induced questioning of this skill-biased technical-change (SBTC)
explanation, with some authors strongly emphasizing changes in institutions (such as
minimum wages and changes in unionization rates) as the more likely exogenous driving
force behind the transformation of the U.S. wage structure: see e.g. Card and DiNardo
(2002) and Lemieux (2006). But Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003) convincingly argue
for a more nuanced way of understanding the impact of technology on the labor market:
technology — and computers in particular — can replace labor in routine tasks — that
is, in tasks that can be codiﬁed into repetitive step-by-step procedures — but not in non-
routine tasks. Using U.S. data, they provide evidence in favor of their routinization-biased
technical change assumption (hereafter, RBTC).
More recently, Goos and Manning (2007) have shown that those tasks that are typically
non-routinizable tend to be concentrated at the two extremes of the skill distribution, and
that employment shares have signiﬁcantly grown in both of these activities during the
last 25 years in the U.K. This phenomenon they refer to as “job polarization” is clearly
consistent with the RBTC hypothesis, and they supply evidence of this against other
potential explanations. Many authors have since then conﬁrmed job polarization as a
stylized fact common to most developed economies: see among others, Autor, Katz and
Kearney (2006) for the U.S.; Spitz-Oener (2006) and Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg
(2009) for Germany; Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009) for most European economies.
Interestingly, Goos and Manning (2007) have also observed in the U.K. that the rise in
the number of low-skill low-paid jobs has coincided with a decline in their pay relative to
those in middling jobs where employment has fallen. This, as they note, does not entirely
ﬁt with the RBTC explanation except if the relative fall of measured-in-eﬃciency-units
wages in routine tasks is being veiled by a disproportionate displacement out of those
jobs by workers with relatively poor skills. This raises the question: are such composition
2eﬀects consistent with RBTC?
In their analysis of U.S. labor markets, Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) also show that
wage inequalities have ceased growing (and for some measures have even narrowed) in the
bottom half of the distribution since the late 80s, while no signiﬁcant change in trend is
observed for upper-half inequality. Thus, wage polarization is a third salient feature of
labor markets in the 90s.
We also know that this slowing in the growth of overall wage inequality emerges mainly
from between-group adjustments: as forcefully shown by Lemieux (2006), residual (within-
group) inequality —i.e., inequalities among observationally equivalent workers— has contin-
ued to rise in the U.S. during the 90s. This is another important stylized fact that needs to
be explained if one wants to understand the current transformations of the labor market.
Our aim in this paper is to provide a theoretical exploration of the general equilibrium
eﬀects of the RBTC assumption, and to establish whether it can, as an exogenous driving
force, account for the stylized facts stated above, that is: i) job polarization, ii) a monoton-
ous increase of average wages with the skill intensity of jobs, iii) wage polarization and iv)
steady rise of within-group (residual) wage inequality. We also want to understand, within
a uniﬁed theoretical framework, the likely consequences of other competing assumptions
that have been proposed in the literature, hopefully to be able to conclude on which is
the more likely cause of recent labor market transformations. Finally, we wish to identify
potential testable diﬀerences that may stimulate empirical investigations.
For this, we develop a multi-task based two-sector general equilibrium model with
explicit distinction between labor skills and tasks. Labor supply is in the form of a dis-
tribution over a continuum of skills, so we avoid the usual somewhat arbitrary exogenous
distinction between skilled and unskilled labor. Workers perform a ﬁnite set of tasks
within ﬁrms which have heterogeneous technologies from which well deﬁned skill demands
are generated; workers endogenously sort themselves between these tasks according to their
respective comparative advantage. We are therefore able to account for labor movements
in and out of tasks, and to measure the eﬀect of these employment changes on equilib-
rium (measured-in-eﬃciency-units) wages, as workers skill up-grade or skill down-grade
depending on the production technologies they end up operating. The framework is ﬁt to
highlight within-task endogenous composition eﬀects, so that individual wage changes can
3be contrasted to average wage changes, and between-group inequality adjustments can be
distinguished from residual (within-group) inequality adjustments. The general equilib-
rium structure takes full account of interactions between labor and product markets, so
that we are able to evaluate how likely it is that demand-composition shifts may cause
labor market transformations consistent with the stylized facts. Finally, we open our eco-
nomy to trade, acknowledging the possibility for ﬁrms to choose whether or not to oﬀshore
outsource the production of some of their intermediate input tasks to cheap labor coun-
tries. This makes it possible to explore the role of globalization in shaping today’s labor
markets, and to confront this, in a single consistent set-up, to other potential causes. The
model is adapted from our previous work on oﬀshore outsourcing (Jung and Mercenier,
2008), itself ﬁrmly rooted in Yeaple (2005).
A few theoretical eﬀorts have been made prior to ours to rationalize recent empirical
ﬁndings on labor market transformations, and they diﬀer signiﬁcantly from this paper.
Building on Autor, Levy and Murnane’s (2003), Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006) present
a simple technology structure to illustrate how in this partial equilibrium setting, the fall
of computer capital prices can induce labor market polarization when capital and labor
employed to perform routine tasks are close substitute. Building on Weiss (2008), Autor
and Dorn (2009) develop a substantially more elaborate general equilibrium framework to
predict labor markets consequences of increased computerization of routine tasks. They
however keep exogenous the dichotomy between skilled and unskilled labor, an assumption
that is not particularly realistic for the period of interest (as they themselves acknow-
ledge1), and also somewhat inappropriate when the focus is on the tasks performed by
workers. Consequently, their analysis concentrates exclusively on the lower-tail distribu-
tion of employment and wages. Furthermore, due to a somewhat questionable assumption
that the unskilled have either homogeneous or heterogeneous skills depending on which
type of tasks they perform, their model generates rather counter-intuitive predictions on
within-group inequalities.2 Finally, they do not address the role of other potential driving
1See page 17; as they report, the non-college share of worked hours has fallen from 58 to 38 percent in
the U.S. between 1980 and 2005.
2As more low-skill workers self-select into the service occupations, within wage inequality decreases in
routine tasks (by a simple compositional eﬀect), while it is constant in manual tasks.
4force explanations, in particular the role of globalization.3
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the core structure of our model
is laid down. Using this closed economy setting, we explore in Section 3 and 4 the eﬀects of
technology based explanations — RBTC and SBTC, and compare these to those induced by
demand-composition shifts. In Section 5, we extend the model to an open economy with
multinationals adopting oﬀshore outsourcing as their optimal business strategy; in this
new environment, we re-address the issue of RBTC and confront its eﬀects with those of
rising globalization. We supplement our theoretical discussion with illustrative numerical
simulations in Section 6, and oﬀer a brief conclusion in Section 7.
2 The closed economy model
2.1 Households
Households have Cobb-Douglas preferences combining two sets of consumption goods, X
and Y .4 Industry X supplies a continuum of diﬀerentiated products, whereas goods from
industry Y are homogeneous. We write:







0 < ρ < 1 (2)
where xd(i) denotes consumption demand for the i variety of products from sector X and
σ = 1/(1−ρ) is a constant diﬀerentiation elasticity.5 Maximizing utility subject to income
3In a recent conference (BIBB-IAB TASKS Workshop, Nürnberg, May 2010) where this paper was
presented, David H. Author, in a keynote presentation, sketched a theoretical model (based on some
ongoing joint work with Daron Acemoglu) that bears similarities with ours, but also has some important
diﬀerences. Contrary to us, they assume three diﬀerent skill levels and a continuum of tasks, so they
are unlikely to be able to account for changes in within-group (residual) inequalities —that is inequalities
among observationally equivalent workers— which is an important feature of recent labor markets (as they
themselves previously emphasized: see Acemoglu 2002, p.10). Also, they develop essentially a closed
economy framework that is unlikely to be able to disentangle the eﬀects of technological change from those
of rising globalization.
4The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences is made for convenience only; the only necessary restric-
tion on preferences is that the consumption goods not be inferior goods.
5This description of the X industry might seem unnecessarily complicated. Indeed, in our closed eco-
nomy setting, treating X as a homogeneous competitively produced good does not qualitatively aﬀect the















pY Y = (1 − β)Inc. (5)
Households also supply labor; there is a continuum of workers diﬀerentiated by their
skill level z with cumulative exogenously given distribution G(z) on support [zmin,zmax].6
Finally, households own a given stock of capital.
2.2 Firms and the labor market
Industry Y is perfectly competitive. We have in mind here the production of tasks that are
typically interactive and therefore cannot be routinized, even though they require poorly
qualiﬁed labor. Examples of such service occupations include taxi driving, cleaning, home
health caring, etc.7 The technology used for producing these tasks is assumed Ricardian
(i.e., with constant unit coeﬃcient) in labor, with marginal cost CY .
In the X industry, each ﬁnal-good variety is produced in amount x(i) by a single ﬁrm.
These goods are substantially more sophisticated than the Y aggregate, so that production
of each of these varieties involves a ﬁxed cost FL before two types of complementary input
activities can be combined, respectively in amount l(i) and m(i). The ﬁrst intermediate
input groups all non-repetitive cognitive tasks, that are generally associated with white-
collar headquarter services. Because these tasks are not easily routinizable, they cannot
be performed by machines but only by relatively skilled labor operating with a technology
that we shall assume Ricardian. In contrast, the second input includes all tasks that are
conclusions. Increasing returns to scale technologies and imperfect competition are however important
ingredients of the globalization process; product diﬀerentiation then becomes both realistic and conveni-
ent when modeling oﬀshore outsourcing decisions by multinational ﬁrms in the open economy. Treating
industry X as producing non homogeneous goods here, both eases the exposition and ensures full compar-
ability between the closed and the open economy versions of the model.
6See Blanchard and Willmann (2008) for an eﬀort to endogenize this skill distribution through invest-
ment decisions in education by individuals.
7Service occupations accounted for slightly less than 15% of employment in the US in 2005, a share
that has been growing at a spectacular pace between 1985 and 2005: see Autor and Dorn (2009, Table 1).
6repetitive by nature, be they manual or cognitive; these include most blue-collar jobs but
also a signiﬁcant subset of (possibly sophisticated) white collar jobs such as bookkeeping.
Because these tasks are easily routinizable, they can be performed almost equally well
by machines or by workers. We emphasize this by assuming that capital and labor enter
as perfect substitutes in the Ricardian technology used for producing intermediate input
tasks m(i). Units in which both intermediate inputs are measured is innocuous and can
be chosen so that the production function writes as:
x(i) = l(i) = m(i). (6)
The marginal costs of producing the two intermediate inputs are denoted CL and CM
respectively. Note that CY , CM and CL are the measured-in-eﬃciency-units wages asso-
ciated with each task type.
An individual worker’s productivity will reﬂect both its own skills, and the type of
task he is hired to perform. Let ϕj(z) denote the productivity of a worker of skill z when
performing task j ∈ {Y,M,L}. ϕj(z) is continuous and increasing in z so that a higher
skilled worker is absolutely more productive than a less skilled one when performing the
same task. We also assume that more talented workers have a comparative advantage in











with ϕj(zmin) = 1, j ∈ {Y,M,L}. Thus, with competitive labor markets, workers will
in equilibrium sort between the three types of activities according to their respective
comparative advantage. Let z0 and z1 be equilibrium skill thresholds with zmin < z0 <
z1 < zmax. Then, the least skilled workers, those with z ∈ [zmin,z0), will be employed in
service occupations producing Y , those with talents z ∈ [z0,z1) will be hired to perform
repetitive tasks within X-ﬁrms, and the most talented, those with z ∈ [z1,zmax] will be
allocated to non-repetitive cognitive activities in headquarters. Figure 1 summarizes these
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Figure 1: The three technologies.
Workers are paid at their marginal productivity, so the wage distribution will satisfy
w(z) =

   
   
CY ϕY (z) zmin ≤ z < z0
CMϕM(z) z0 ≤ z < z1
CLϕL(z) z1 ≤ z ≤ zmax.
(8)
Individuals with skills z0 and z1 have, in equilibrium, no incentive to relocate between
tasks, a no-arbitrage condition that ties together the wages Cj, j ∈ {Y,M,L}:
CY ϕY (z0) = CMϕM(z0)
CMϕM(z1) = CLϕL(z1).
(9)










Observe from (7) that CY > CM > CL and that CM and CL are decreasing respectively
in z0 and z1. The resulting equilibrium wage distribution is illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: The equilibrium wage distribution.
Marginal cost pricing holds in competitive Y activities so that pY = CY . Following
Krugman (1981), we assume that monopolistic competition prevails between symmetric
ﬁrms producing diﬀerent varieties of X; with Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (2) it is optimal for
each producer to charge a constant mark-up rate σ
σ−1 over marginal cost; the symmetry
assumption ensures that all varieties will have the same price:
pL = p(i) =
σ
σ − 1
(CL + CM) i ∈ NL (12)
where NL is the number of producers.
92.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium skill threshold z0 determines employment in service occupations that will
satisfy the demand for the Y -good:
  z0
zmin
ϕY (z)dG(z) = Y. (13)
In the X industry, each ﬁrm satisﬁes the demand for its own ﬁnal variety, so that
xL = x(i) = xd(i) i ∈ NL. (14)
We assume free entry, so that there are no extra-normal proﬁts, and mark-up revenues
will exactly cover ﬁxed costs. We can, for convenience, express the ﬁxed costs in the form




pLxL = (CL + CM)FL. (15)
Observe, by combining (12) and (15), that the individual ﬁrm’s output is constant and
proportional to its ﬁxed costs. This is quite convenient because it implies that changes in
the industry market-size will aﬀect the number of ﬁrms NL only, without inducing within
ﬁrm adjustments.
The total amount of labor used in the production of headquarter services follows from
the technology (6):   zmax
z1
ϕL(z)dG(z) = NL (xL + FL), (16)








where κM > 1 accounts for the contribution of capital: conditions (16) and (17) determine











This completes the description of our general equilibrium model.
103 Routinization-biased technical change (RBTC)
We now turn to a formal deﬁnition of routinization-biased technical change, and analyze
its eﬀects on the labor market. We want to capture the eﬀects of the ongoing fall in the
cost of computerizing routine tasks on the production process within ﬁrms. We interpret
RBTC as a positive supply shock on capital —a rise of κM in (17)— that will substitute
out labor in the production of repetitive tasks; furthermore, because this capital embodies
technical progress, it is also likely to push up the relative productivity of the more talented
workers by raising the slope of the skill-productivity proﬁle in M-activities of Figure 1.8
To understand how RBTC will aﬀect the equilibrium wage distribution in Figure 2,
we focus on how the skill thresholds z0 and z1 are being displaced. Consider ﬁrst the
eﬀects of a steeper productivity schedule lnϕM(z). At the initially given skill distribution
of jobs (keeping z0 and z1 temporarily ﬁxed), the productivity induced wage increase in
routine tasks will spread to all headquarter workers as the eﬃciency-unit wage CL rises
to match the wage of the most talented M-worker: dlnCL = dlnCMϕM(z1) > 0. From
(17), however, it is apparent that, for z0 given, z1 has to be reduced to restore the balance
between input tasks within the X industry: the new technology forces X-ﬁrms to relocate
the best among workers in repetitive M-tasks to headquarter activities where they will
perform L-type tasks making use of the more eﬃcient L-technology, and therefore earn
better wages. This skill-upgrading of workers contributes to push CL further up. Observe
that the impact on pL is yet ambiguous because CM has fallen. For given z0, more
abundant computer capital (dκM > 0) can only amplify the movement of workers from M
to L tasks within X-ﬁrms: z1 is further shifted to the left with relative wages of all workers
in non-repetitive tasks rising as skill-upgrading of less talented workers proceeds. At this
stage, it is clear that both employment and wages (measured in eﬃciency units) have
risen in L activities and fallen in repetitive tasks M. z0, however, is not an equilibrium
threshold: the Y good is obviously now in relative scarce supply, so that its price has to
rise (that is, CM and CL have to fall in equal proportion relative to the numeraire CY ),
making it possible for producers in the Y industry to oﬀer better wages and attract workers
8To ensure a unique interior solution requires that the new productivity schedule complies to restrictions
(7).
11previously employed in repetitive intermediate M-tasks: the threshold z0 is being pushed
to the right as these workers skill-downgrade. This induced expansion of the Y -sector
tends to mitigate the initial leftward shift of z1, obviously without qualitatively aﬀecting
the mechanism described (the assumption that Y is a non-inferior good ensures that both
the price and the output volume will adjust upward). Figure 3 displays how RBTC has
aﬀected the equilibrium wage distribution.
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of RBTC on the equilibrium wage distribution.
RBTC has generated unambiguous job polarization: a shrinking share of employment
in intermediate repetitive activities, with a labor force being increasingly concentrated in
the lowest and in the highest wage occupations, both characterized by the non-routinizable
nature of the performed tasks. Wages have also unambiguously polarized, consistently with
the stylized facts with dlnCL > dlnCY = 0 > dlnCM : M- to Y - relative wages fall, and
12those in headquarter activities increase relative to those in both M and Y tasks.
What can be said on the eﬀect of RBTC on average wages by occupations? With z0
being shifted to the right, the average wage unambiguously rises in Y -type tasks. Indeed,
(even though for those individual workers this is a skill-downgrading move associated with
a wage loss,) they come with better skill endowments than those previously engaged in
performing those tasks and therefore contribute positively to the average wage in Y .9 In
the other occupations, however, the sign of average-wage changes is ambiguous because
of composition eﬀects. Indeed, though individual wages have risen for all who now work
in headquarter jobs, those newly hired to perform non-repetitive cognitive tasks are less
talented. The same ambiguity prevails in occupations M because workers that move out
of the repetitive-type activities do so either by skill-upgrading or by skill-downgrading,
and are respectively the most- and the least- talented originally employed to perform these
tasks. This highlights the diﬃculty of associating technical change to average productivity
growth even with task-level disaggregation: the only tasks here that display unambiguous
average productivity gains experience no technical change, even though individual workers
here earn either unchanged or lower wages than before. We nevertheless conclude that the
RBTC assumption can indeed induce the composition eﬀects necessary to ﬁt the second
stylized fact.
Observe that RBTC generates changes in wage inequalities that are broadly consist-
ent with observed recent trends reported by Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006): a rise in
the upper-half inequality, as measured by the 90-50 log-wage diﬀerential, results unam-
biguously, whereas changes in the lower-half inequality will typically be much lower.10
More remarkable is the prediction that wage inequalities unambiguously rise among ob-
servationally equivalent workers performing identical tasks. Our model therefore oﬀers an
explanation for the well documented fact that overall and within-group wage inequality
9This prediction is quite consistent with the often reported observation that an increasing proportion
of middle-skilled people report that they are employed in jobs for which they are overqualiﬁed. See e.g.
Green and McIntosh (2007).
10A contraction in the 50-10 log-wage diﬀerential, as has been observed in the U.S. economy between
1987 and 2004 (Autor, Katz and Kearney, 2006), could also be obtained in this simple two sector model,
but it would result from a special choice of technology gaps between activities and/or of initial relative
positions of the equilibrium skill thresholds.
13growth have been changing in a very disproportionate way (and for some measures even
in opposite directions), and demonstrates how these observations can be reconciled under
RBTC.
We have, up to now, ignored the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) assumption. It
has become evident from the literature about job polarization that the most important
diﬀerence between RBTC and SBTC is their prediction about employment and wage
growth at the lower end of the skill distribution. SBTC predicts that, the lower the skill-
level required to perform a job, the easier it is for new machines to substitute for labor.
In the context of this model at least, it is straightforward to understand why SBTC is
very unlikely to be the cause of the recently observed transformations of the labor market.
To see this, consider the possibility that capital enters the production function for Y as a




ϕY (z)dG(z) = Y κY > 1 (19)
with income deﬁnition (18) modiﬁed accordingly. Assume dκY > dκM > 0; for given
z0, the X-good is now in relative scarce supply, so that PX/PY will rise; producers of
X-varieties experience positive extra-normal proﬁts so that new ﬁrms enter the market.
This increases competition for labor and measured-in-eﬃciency-units wages will rise in
that sector. The best workers previously employed in service occupations ﬁnd it at-
tractive to move to X-ﬁrms where they skill-upgrade and earn better wages: z0 shifts
left, as well as z1 (the latter in order to restore the balance between M and L input
tasks) so that 0 < dlnCM < dlnCL until product market equilibrium is restored. SBTC
has eroded employment in low-skill tasks, increased employment in other activities, and
unambiguously shifted the wage distribution in favor of the more talented workers. As-
suming, in addition, that the technical progress embodied in the new machines also in-
creases more the slope of the skill-productivity schedule in the production of the Y tasks
(dlnϕY (z) > dlnϕM(z) > 0) can only reinforce the adjustment mechanism just described.
SBTC is indeed clearly inconsistent with labor market polarization.
144 Demand-composition shifts
Polarization could however be driven by factors other than technology. Demographic
trends, for instance, are likely to induce demand composition shifts: an ageing population
will increase its expenditure shares for services such as outside-family care and hospital
assistants, which are mainly non routinizable tasks performed by low-skilled low-paid
workers. Also, it has been suggested (Manning, 2004) that rising wage inequalities may
have contributed to displace demand in favor of low quality jobs because of the relatively
high income elastic nature of demand for services such as child care. How will such shift
in preferences impact on the labor market? The answer is provided in Figure 4, where it
is shown that neither job nor wage polarization can result from such a change.
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of a preference shift in favor of service occupations.
To understand why, consider the eﬀects of an exogenous reduction of β in (1). The
15impact eﬀect is to increase the relative price of the competitive good, as well as wages
for those tasks (dlnCM = d1 lnCL < 0), making it attractive for lower-skilled M-task
workers to skill-downgrade by moving into the Y jobs: z0 shifts to the right. X-ﬁrms are
forced into restructuring, reducing wages in oversized headquarter activities (d2 lnCL < 0);
the least talented among the workers engaged in such activities now ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
skill-downgrade and perform M-tasks: dz1 > 0. In equilibrium therefore, aggregate em-
ployment in cognitive non-repetitive tasks cannot have expanded, and workers performing
those tasks have experienced wage losses more important than in other activities. Clearly,
neither job polarization nor wage polarization is a possibility here.
5 Globalization
The impact of globalization on labor markets is also potentially considerable. Drastic
advances in transportation and communication technologies coupled with institutional
progress in many cheap labor countries provide ﬁrms in the North with strong new in-
centives to extensively adopt oﬀshore outsourcing strategies and transfer larger parts of
their production activities to the South. There is ample evidence that this transfer is
biased towards dominantly routine —blue-collar as well as white-collar— tasks. It seems
therefore that the computerization of routine tasks and the rise of oﬀshore outsourcing
tend to contribute in a similar way to the recent transformations of the labor market in
the North. Our simple model can easily be extended to shed some light on the role of
oﬀshore outsourcing in the shaping of labor markets.
5.1 Extending the model: multinationals and oﬀshore outsourcing
Each multinational ﬁrm produces a speciﬁc variety of the X-good —the description of
the domestic household part of the model is therefore unaﬀected— combining two comple-
mentary inputs using a Leontief technology similar to (6). Assume now that there are
two competing technologies available for producing headquarter services, a high- (H) and
a low- (L) technology. Technology H is more expensive to set-up but cheaper to operate
than tech L so that FL < FH and CL > CH, where Fj and Cj denote respectively ﬁxed
16and marginal costs of production, j = L,H. Though headquarter services can only be
produced domestically, repetitive intermediate tasks can be either performed locally or
oﬀshored. In the home country, as before, they involve using an M technology with mar-
ginal cost CM; performed in the South, these activities have a lower unit production cost
C∗
M = θCM, θ < 1. But oﬀshore outsourcing involves speciﬁc ﬁxed costs FI so that only
the most productive X-ﬁrms can turn multinational. There is ample empirical evidence
that, everything else equal, multinationals (MNEs) are systematically more eﬃcient than
non-MNEs.11 We can therefore assume FI and θ such that, in equilibrium, only ﬁrms
using the H technology ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀshore the production of their repetitive in-
termediate tasks; domestic-only L-ﬁrms are therefore as described in our closed economy
setting.
The best workers have an absolute advantage over less talented rivals on any technology,
and a comparative advantage for performing high tech tasks H: the productivity functions







with ϕj(zmin) = 1, so that, with competitive labor markets, the high-z workers will be
hired to perform nonrepetitive cognitive tasks within MNEs. Let z2 ∈ (z1,zmax) be the
skill-threshold separating those headquarter workers that are employed in domestic only
ﬁrms (z < z2) from those employed by MNEs. Then, the latter will earn w(z) = CHϕH(z),
z2 ≤ z ≤ zmax, with the measured-in-eﬃciency-units wages CL and CH tied together by
the indiﬀerence condition:
CLϕL(z2) = CHϕH(z2). (21)
Observe that (20) ensures CL > CH and CH decreasing in z2. The resulting equilib-
rium wage distribution in this open-economy set-up with oﬀshore-outsourcing MNEs is
illustrated in Figure 5.
11See e.g. Doms and Jensen (1998), Conyon, Girma and Wright (2002). Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple
(2004) highlight that MNEs are substantially more productive than non-MNE exporters which outperform
signiﬁcantly purely domestic ones. See also Navaretti, Castellani and Disdier (2006) for a discussion, and
some empirical evidence, on technological upgrading related to ﬁrms switching from national to multina-
tional.
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Figure 5: The open economy equilibrium wage distribution.
MNEs compete with domestic-only ﬁrms on monopolistically competitive product mar-
ket; with preferences (2) they will charge constant mark-up rates; making the assumption
of symmetry among MNEs implies that they will charge the same price and have the same
output scale:
pH = p(i) =
σ
σ − 1
(CH + θCM) i ∈ NH, (22)







p(i)x(i) = (CH + θCM)   (FH + FI) i ∈ NH. (23)
(Here again, we have expressed real ﬁxed costs in terms of foregone output volumes.)
Observe that multinationals will charge lower prices than their national-only competitors,
as realism suggests.
Equilibrium conditions (16) and (17) still hold after substitution of z2 for zmax in the
integral signs; the total amount of domestic labor employed by MNEs follows from our
18assumptions on technology similar to (6):
  zmax
z2
ϕH(z)dG(z) = NH (xH + FH + FI). (24)




















To avoid unnecessary balance of payment complications, we assume that Inc∗ is spent
entirely on X-goods from the North, with preferences identical to (2); each variety i is







i ∈ N = NL ∪ NH (27)
where PX is given by (4). Each X-ﬁrm will in equilibrium satisfy the demand for its own
variety, so that (14) becomes
x(i) = xd(i) + xd∗(i) i ∈ N = NL ∪ NH (28)
which completes the open economy version of our model.
5.2 RBTC in the open economy
Before addressing the issue of rising globalization, we discuss how the presence of MNEs
could possibly —though indeed somewhat unlikely— aﬀect our previous assessment of the
RBTC hypothesis. For this purpose, our closed economy reasoning can be replicated:
clearly, nothing is changed as long as z2 is kept ﬁxed. It is immediate to check that
with z2 unchanged, the cost ratios CM/C∗
M and CL/CH also remain unchanged, but not
necessarily the output price ratio pL/pH: this will depend on the initial marginal input-
cost shares. Changes in pL/pH will be ￿ 0 iff CH ￿ θCL, that is, iff ϕL(z2) ￿ θϕH(z2).
Thus, at given z2, if the technology gap between L and H ﬁrms is large enough, X-varieties
from high-tech ﬁrms will be in relative scarcity: product market equilibrium requires
19from these ﬁrms more output. Increasing the scale of oﬀshored activities is no problem
for multinational ﬁrms since labor is abundant enough in the South to leave unaﬀected
the marginal production costs of these repetitive intermediate input tasks. In the home
country, however, skilled labor has to be pulled out of the national-only competitors.
Multinationals achieve this by oﬀering better wages: z2 shifts leftward, hence amplifying
the ongoing labor market polarization.12 The wage increase granted to workers with
z > z2 is passed over to pH, inducing demand substitution that also contributes to restore
product market equilibrium. This adjustment continues until the output price ratio pL/pH
recovers its initial equilibrium value.13 In this case, therefore, the conclusions reached for
the closed economy are unaﬀected: the presence of multinational ﬁrms tends to amplify
the labor market transformations induced by RBTC. This case is displayed in Figure 6.
12Observe that, simultaneously, income rises in the South; this tends to bias aggregate ﬁnal demand in
favor of the X good, and to mitigate employment and wage growth at the lower end of the skill distribution.
It is a second order eﬀect, however, that does not aﬀect the qualitative conclusions.
13Indeed, making use of (15) and (23), after substituting out prices and output (from (12), (22), (3),
(27) and (28)), it is easy to show from the ratio
pLxL
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Figure 6: The eﬀects of RBTC on the equilibrium wage distribution when the tech-gap
between MNEs and non-MNEs is large enough.
This is not the only possible equilibrium outcome, however. Indeed, if the technology
advantage of MNEs is not large enough, so that CH > θCL, at given initial z2, RBTC
produces a costs advantage in favor of national only ﬁrms: the price ratio pL/pH will have
changed in favor of domestic only ﬁrms. Demand substitution forces MNEs to downscale
their labor force: z2 moves to the right, and so does z1. In this case, therefore, the impact
of RBTC on the equilibrium job distribution is ambiguous. It will crucially depend on
how substitutable L and H varieties are, that is, on the value of the preference parameter
σ: the more X-varieties are diﬀerentiated (σ low), the more likely it is that RBTC will be
consistent with the stylized facts.14
We have shown how diﬃcult it is to generalize to the open economy conclusions on
the role of technology in shaping labor markets drawn from a closed economy analysis.
14In the very special case where CH = θCL, the equilibrium ratio pL/pH is ﬁxed and RBTC does not
aﬀect the relative competitiveness of MNEs and the equilibrium skill threshold z2 remains unchanged.
21Things tend to be much more complicated in open economies: by their oﬀshore outsourcing
practices, MNEs will amplify, mitigate or even possibly counter, the direct eﬀect of RBTC
on the job and wage distributions. The productivity diﬀerence between MNEs and non-
MNEs plays here a crucial role: the lower this diﬀerence, the less RBTC seems likely
to cause labor market polarization. There is abundant evidence that multinationals are
more productive than national-only ﬁrms (of course, after controlling for output scale).
Is the tech-gap large enough to realistically make RBTC the main explanation? Before
we venture an answer to that question, we have to understand the consequences of rising
globalization on the labor market. This is what we now turn to.
5.3 Rising globalization
Rising globalization naturally takes two non-exclusive forms in this model: a fall of the
ﬁxed cost of engaging in oﬀshore outsourcing activities (dFI < 0), and a reduction of
marginal cost of producing repetitive tasks abroad (dθ < 0), the latter interpreted to
include transportation costs.15 Both shocks yield identical qualitative equilibrium eﬀects
—albeit through slightly diﬀerent channels— so we focus our exposition on the ﬁrst. Lower
ﬁxed costs FI directly induce technology upgrading in the X-industry: an increasing
number of low-tech producers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to turn multinational and switch to high-
tech.16 For given z0, this induces a contraction of activity in national-only X-ﬁrms with z1
and z2 both being shifted to the left.17 Some workers therefore become more productive by
performing diﬀerent tasks within the same domestic-only ﬁrms, and others by performing
the same tasks but in a diﬀerent more eﬃcient MNE — a mechanism well documented
by Head and Ries (2002), among others18. This simultaneous technology upgrading by
15Explicitly introducing ice-berg transportation costs is straightforward but only complicates without
adding insight; it only aﬀects income levels in the South.
16More rigorously, there is entry (exit) of high-tech (low-tech) ﬁrms. It can be shown —see Jung and
Mercenier (2008)— that creations exceed destructions so that the total number of ﬁrms will increase, for
given z0.
17With a falling θ, the mechanism is slightly less direct: the price ratio pL/pH rises inducing demand
substitutions within the X industry, away from L-varieties. The size of MN activities will unambiguously
increase, with identical qualitative eﬀect on z1 and z2, for given z0 .
18Head and Ries (2002) investigate the inﬂuence of oﬀshore production by Japanese multinationals on
domestic skill intensity, using ﬁrm-level data. They ﬁnd that additional foreign aﬃliate employment in low
22ﬁrms and skill upgrading of workers induced by globalization unambiguously increase real
domestic income,19 and consequently the demand for the competitive good, requiring more
labor in that sector: dz0 > 0 as relative wages rise in low-skill tasks and labor pours out
of the intermediate M-tasks. Foreign income also beneﬁts from expanding MN activities,
increasing the demand for the country’s exports. This contributes to raise even more the
price of X, inducing domestic consumers to substitute in favor of the non-traded service
occupations hence pushing z0 further to the right. The new equilibrium wage distribution
is shown in Figure 7, and clearly displays job and wage polarization.
income countries raises skill intensity at home, but that this eﬀect falls as investment shifts towards high
income countries. This is clearly consistent with vertical specialization, and provides evidence that vertical
specialization by multinationals contributes to skill upgrading domestically. Hansson (2005) reaches similar
conclusions on Swedish MNEs during the years 1990-97.
19See Jung and Mercenier (2008) for a formal demonstration.
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Figure 7: The eﬀect of rising globalization on the equilibrium wage distribution.
RBTC and rising globalization can therefore have very similar eﬀects, as one should
presumably have expected. Our analysis highlights important qualitative diﬀerences between
the two, however. A ﬁrst diﬀerence is that job and wage polarization is the only possible
equilibrium outcome of the globalization shock, whereas it is not for RBTC, as we have
shown. The two shocks being simultaneous, they could yield opposite eﬀects on the job
and wage distributions, with globalization providing the strongest driving force. Though it
is possible that in the future, as the relative intensity of these two forces change, empirical
results will uncover such opposing eﬀects, the evidence we have today seems to militate
against such a possibility (see for instance Goos and Manning, 2007). We conclude that
both shocks are equally likely to cause current labor market polarization.
24A second important diﬀerence is that, with rising globalization, all workers that remain
aﬀected to performing M-tasks suﬀer a same proportional wage loss, independently of their
skill level. The reason is that globalization acts as a demand-side shock on the production
of these tasks by shifting leftward the global demand for these tasks; in contrast, RBTC
acts as an internal transformation force that aﬀects the way these tasks are being performed
within each ﬁrm. This has two interesting implications. Firstly, globalization should be
redrawing the average wage curve into a U-shape, which is not what the second stylized
fact suggests. Secondly, a contraction of the 50-10 log-wage diﬀerential appears to be a
robust consequence of the globalization shock20 though it is only one among other possible
outcomes of RBTC. In contrast, only RBTC induces wage inequalities to rise within the
same repetitive task activities. This clearly suggests that the RBTC assumption is the only
one that can generate eﬀects consistent with the observation that overall and within-group
wage inequalities are changing in a very disproportionate way, and for some measures even
in opposite directions (stylized fact four). It seems therefore that globalization and the
rise of oﬀshore outsourcing cannot be the dominant driving force responsible for the recent
transformations of labor markets (consistently with the empirical ﬁndings of Feenstra and
Hanson (1999), among others).
6 A numerical illustration
6.1 The initial equilibrium
In this section, we illustrate our theoretical discussion with numerical simulations. To
do this, we ﬁrst set the stage by characterizing the initial equilibrium of this illustrative
economy. Service occupations account for approximately 10% of U.S. national income,
so we set β = 0.90 for household preferences. We follow Krugman (1991) and choose
σ = 4 for the diﬀerentiation elasticity. We assume a uniform density distribution g(z)
for skills. Consistently with our graphical representation in Figure 1, technologies are
20Provided, of course, that non-routine low-skill jobs account for more than 10%, and non-repetitive
cognitive jobs less than 50% of the labor force, as realism suggests.
25assumed log-linear. We set:
lnϕY (z) ≈ 0.930 ∗ z
lnϕM(z) = 1.10 ∗ lnϕY (z)
lnϕL(z) ≈ 1.435 ∗ z
lnϕH(z) = 1.10 ∗ lnϕL(z).
Empirical evidence on the level of the ﬁxed costs is scarce but it is generally thought that
the total ﬁxed costs of a vertically fragmented ﬁrm is less than twice those of a domestic
ﬁrm. We choose the following relative ﬁxed costs:
FL = 1.00
FH + FI = 1.62
The previous assumptions on the technologies imply a calibrated value of θ ≈ 0.90. The






With these parameter values, we are able to compute the initial equilibrium, character-
ized by the following employment shares, GNP shares, and relative wages (measured in







Y 16.9 10 1.000
M 52.9 46 .983
L 24.5 34 .725
H 5.7 10 .628
26These shares are quite reasonable, and suggest that the values chosen for the paramet-
ers bear some realism.21
6.2 Comparing results from competing assumptions
Table 1 reports, for the four diﬀerent shocks discussed in the text, the computed eﬀects
(as % deviations from initial equilibrium) on job shares and wages (the latter measured
both in eﬃciency units and as averages per job) by type of tasks, as well as within-task
wage Theil-inequality measures. The results are also graphed in Figures 8,9 and 10, as
indices.
To get these numbers, the following shocks have been implemented: for RBTC, we
multiply both κM and the slope of the productivity schedule lnϕM(z) by 2%; for SBTC
we add to this a 4% increment to dlnϕY (z)/dz; to capture the eﬀect of increasing global-
ization, we reduce FI by 1%;22 an ageing population is assumed to reduce its consumption
share β by 2%. The size of these shocks is of course arbitrary and has been chosen so as
to yield eﬀects of approximately the same magnitudes: we have checked that none of the
qualitative results depend on the amplitude of the shocks within the range consistent with
an interior solution.
We check from these results that the only two driving forces that cause job and wage
polarization are indeed RBTC and globalization. Nevertheless, the two have very diﬀerent
eﬀects on average wages. The globalization-induced contraction of employment in routine
tasks comes with a fall of the average wage which, as we already know from our theoretical
analysis, need not be due to composition changes only: all workers that remain employed
to perform those tasks see their wages fall in equal proportions so that within-task wage
inequalities are reduced. With RBTC, in contrast, rising residual wage inequalities tend
to counter —or to add-up to— skill composition changes in routine tasks.
21The values of the parameters characterizing the diﬀerent technologies were actually calibrated to
reproduce approximately U.S. employment and GDP shares.
22As we know —and indeed have checked— reducing θ has the same qualitative eﬀects.
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Y  1.661  −2.281  4.040  0.260 
M  −1.782  −0.136  −0.963  −2.583 
L  1.622  1.748  −0.659  −1.134 
H  4.629  0.518  −0.196  27.860 
L+H  2.194  1.514  −0.571  4.380 
Wages 
(efficiency u.) 
       
CY  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
CM  −0.401  0.038  −0.068  −0.004 
CL  1.404  0.238  −0.143  0.574 
CH  1.445  0.242  −0.144  0.820 
Average 
wage per job 
       
Y  0.143  −0.196  0.348  0.022 
M  0.336  −0.424  0.372  −0.769 
L  0.707  −0.114  −0.010  −1.657 
H  1.223  0.218  −0.135  −0.500 




       
TY  3.362  −4.502  8.241  0.532 
TM  0.356  −0.269  −1.906  −5.063 
TL  3.257  3.514  −1.306  −2.248 
TH  9.477  1.051  −0.392  63.490 
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Figure 8: Eﬀects of competing shocks on employment shares, indices.
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RBTC SBTC Ageing Globalization
Figure 9: Eﬀects of competing shocks on wages (measured in eﬃciency units), indices.
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Figure 10: Eﬀects of competing shocks on task average wages, indices.
297 Conclusion
Labor markets are undergoing important transformations since the early 90s. This has
been extensively documented, and some stylized facts clearly emerge from a now abund-
ant empirical literature. Various explanations have been proposed, and to some extent
confronted with the data. We are not aware of any eﬀort made to systematically explore
the theoretical implications of these hypotheses —which are obviously general equilibrium—
nor of tentative to rigorously evaluate their ability to ﬁt the stylized facts. Our paper
contributes to ﬁll that gap.
We have developed a theoretical framework that is rich enough for the purpose at
hand, yet actually very simple. The model has ﬁrst been developed and explored in the
context of a closed economy. We have investigated how well three of the main suggested
explanations —namely RBTC, SBTC and demand shifts due to ageing and/or non ho-
mothetic preferences— do ﬁt the empirical evidence. We show that only the ﬁrst of these
assumptions can account for the stylized facts. Key to this conclusion is our explicit mod-
eling of workers’ ability to skill up/down-grade endogenously as they relocate themselves
to diﬀerent tasks because of changing comparative advantages.
The analysis has then been generalized to the open economy within a globalized world.
To the endogenous skill up/down-grading of workers as they move to diﬀerent tasks, glob-
alization adds the possibility for ﬁrms to endogenously choose the geographic location
—locally or oﬀshore— of part of their production and, doing so, to technology up/down-
grade their production technologies. We have shown that with this additional mechanism
the conclusions on the role of technical progress in shaping labor markets could qualit-
atively be aﬀected, though this does not seem to be empirically relevant, at least up to
now. Not surprisingly, RBTC and rising globalization are shown to have very similar
eﬀects on the employment and wage (measured in eﬃciency units) distributions by tasks.
But we are able to highlight more sophisticated potential diﬀerences between the two, in
particular with respect to wage inequalities. We show that they are not equally likely to
explain the observed slowing in the growth of overall wage inequality through between-
group adjustments. Furthermore, according to our analysis, only RBTC could cause the
30rise in residual inequality —i.e., inequalities among observationally equivalent workers—, a
phenomenon well documented for which few convincing explanations are available. This
is because globalization acts on the local production of intermediate repetitive tasks by
shifting the global demand for these domestically-performed tasks to the left; in contrast,
RBTC acts as a supply-side force that induces internal transformations of the way these
tasks are being performed within each ﬁrm. Needless to say, this discriminating conclusion
stems on our formalization of the two competing assumptions. Whether our implement-
ation of these driving forces is or not realistic is of course an empirical question, but
the assumption that the technical progress embodied in new equipments will boost the
productivity of workers performing routine tasks can hardly be perceived as unlikely.
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